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Unraveling Reduces Mobility in a Labor Market:
Gastroenterology with and without a
Centralized Match
Muriel Niederle
Stanford University
Alvin E. Roth
Harvard University
The entry-level market for American gastroenterologistswasorganized
by a centralized clearinghouse from 1986 to 1996. Before, and since,
it has been conducted via a decentralized market in which appoint-
ment dates have unraveled to well over a year before the start of
employment. We ﬁnd that, both before and after the years in which
the centralized clearinghouse was used, gastroenterologists are less
mobile and more likely to be employed at the same hospital in which
they were internal medicine residents than when the clearinghouse
was in use. This suggests that the clearinghouse not only coordinates
the timing of appointments but also increases the scope of the market,
compared to a decentralized market with early appointments.
I. Introduction
In many entry-level labor markets, there have been vigorous efforts to
halt the “unraveling” of appointment dates. Unraveling is typically a
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dynamic process in which offers are made earlier from year to year.
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However, efforts to simply impose uniform appointment dates have most
often been unsuccessful.
Some markets have successfully used a centralized clearinghouse to
halt the unraveling. There is a good deal of empirical evidence (e.g.,
Roth 1984, 1991; Roth and Xing 1994) that a key factor in the success
of a clearinghouse is whether it produces matches that are stable in the
sense that there exist no ﬁrm and worker who are not matched to one
another but who would both prefer to be matched to one another rather
than accept the results of the clearinghouse (cf. Gale and Shapley 1962;
Roth and Sotomayor 1990).
2
To investigate the effect of a centralized clearinghouse on the market
it serves, one would want to compare the matchings of applicants to
positions when the clearinghouse was in operation to those in the pe-
riods both before and after, and so separate the effect of the clearing-
house from other changes in the market over time. Such data are rare,
because it is rare for stable clearinghouses to fail. However, as will be
described below, gastroenterology had a centralized match from 1986
through 1996 and an unraveled, decentralized market both before and
since. (McKinney, Niederle, and Roth [2003] identify gastroenterology
as one of only three failures in around a hundred markets organized
around a stable clearinghouse.) The availability of data from the gas-
troenterology market therefore provides us with a unique opportunity.
One effect of a successful clearinghouse is that it halts unraveling and
postpones appointments, allowing ﬁrms and applicants to have more
information about each other’s qualities. Roth and Xing (1994) note
an additional potential cost of unraveling: as markets unravel, they be-
come thinner, since different ﬁrms make offers at different times. By
making exploding offers, ﬁrms limit the ability of applicants to consider
alternative offers (cf. the market for law clerks described in Avery et al.
[2001]). In a number of markets, there has been anecdotal evidence
that this reduces the scope of the market and forces ﬁrms to rely more
1 For example, two markets that are presently experiencing this kind of unraveling are
the market for law clerks for federal appellate judges (cf. Avery et al. 2001), in which
offers have recently been made almost two years in advance of employment, and the
market for college admissions (cf. Avery, Fairbanks, and Zeckhauser 2003), in which elite
colleges admit a high percentage of their entering classes through “early decision” pro-
grams that require applicants to commit in advance to one college that they will accept
its offer if they are admitted early. Roth and Xing (1994) describe several dozen such
markets and submarkets.In marketsthatexperienceunraveling,applicantstypicallyreceive
“exploding” offers that must be accepted or rejected before (sometimes any) other offers
can be received and considered (see, e.g., Niederle and Roth 2003a).
2 Many labor markets have features that complicate the deﬁnition of stability; see, e.g.,
Roth and Peranson (1999) for a description of stability in the market for medicalresidents.
The market for gastroenterologists is smaller and simpler than the resident match, and
the deﬁnition of stability given here is sufﬁcient.1344 journal of political economy
on local applicants. (In Britain, when the market for entry-level medical
positions unraveled to over a year before students graduated from med-
ical school, positions at teaching hospitals seemed often to be ﬁlled with
students from the associated medical school [Roth 1990, 1991]. In Ja-
pan, early recruiting is often accomplished through semiformal “old
boys” networks, in which graduates from a given university are recruited
by former students of that university [Roth and Xing 1994; Rebick
2000].) So a centralized clearinghouse may not only help control market
timing but also increase the scope of the market and reduce the need
for market participants to rely on informal networks.
An alternative hypothesis is suggested by recent theoretical work by
Li and Rosen (1998), Li and Suen (2000), and Suen (2000), who show
how unraveling can occur as a form of insurance in competitive markets.
In their models, markets clear early but remain competitive, and the
scope of the market is not affected by its timing.
One way to assess the impact of the match, and distinguish between
these hypotheses, will be to track the scope of the gastroenterology
market over time by examining the extent to which gastroenterologists
are recruited locally or nationally before, during, and after the match.
Because the collapse of the match was sudden, its effect on market
outcomes may be particularly visible in the comparison between the
match and its aftermath.
3
A reduction in mobility may also be an indirect indicator of a re-
duction in efﬁciency, although here we need to be very careful. A wide
view of efﬁciency in this market would have to include not only the
preferences of the market participants—the fellows and their employ-
ers—but also the effect that the distribution of fellows to hospitals has
on how much the fellows learn and the long-term effect of this on the
incidence of gastroenterological diseases. We know of no data that could
allow us to measure either the quality of education that fellows receive
or the effect this has on the incidence of disease in a way that would
allow these issues to be separated from general improvements in health
care.
A more narrow view of efﬁciency would involve only the preferences
and welfare of the market participants. In experiments (Kagel and Roth
2000; Haruvy, Roth, and U ¨nver 2001; McKinney et al. 2003; Niederle
and Roth 2003a), unraveling occurs despite the fact that the market
participants overall earn less money. In the ﬁeld data, we have no way
to directly observe physician and hospital preferences and, hence, par-
ticipant welfare. However, if it is efﬁcient for the market to operate
more locally, this is something that we would expect to have occurred
3 There is reason to believe that the effects of a match follow only gradually on its initial
introduction to a market (see Kagel and Roth 2000; McKinney et al. 2003).mobility in a labor market 1345
during the match, since a stable match is an efﬁcient outcome. Con-
sequently, when we observe that matching becomes more national in
scope during the match and becomes increasingly local after the demise
of the match, this is suggestive of efﬁciency losses as well.
II. The Gastroenterology Market
Gastroenterology is a subspecialty of internal medicine. A typical gas-
troenterology fellow will have previously been employed for three years
following medical school as a resident in internal medicine (qualifying
to be a board-certiﬁed specialist in internal medicine) and then started
a gastroenterology fellowship, at the end of which he will be eligible to
be a board-certiﬁed subspecialist.
The history of the market for gastroenterology fellowship positions
is similar to that of many medical markets and submarkets (Roth 1984;
Roth and Xing 1994). Before 1985, it suffered from the unraveling of
appointment dates, and a number of solutions were attempted prior to
the adoption of a centralized match. In 1986 the Medical Specialties
Matching Program (MSMP) was initiated by the National Resident
Matching Program (NRMP) as part of the Specialties Matching Services.
Starting in 1989, the match was conducted for gastroenterology, car-
diovascular disease, and pulmonary disease, and since 1994 also for
infectious disease (all these are subspecialties of internal medicine).
The objective was to establish a uniform appointment date for internal
medicine fellowship positions and permit applicants to complete at least
two years of their residency before making a decision as to which sub-
specialty to pursue. The fellowship clearinghouse was conducted a year
in advance, that is, after two years of internal medicine residency and
one year before employment would begin (National Resident Matching
Program 1999).
In such a clearinghouse, applicants and fellowship programs submit
rank order lists over positions and applicants, respectively. Then the
lists are processed to produce a stable match.
However, from 1997 to 1999 the centralized match suffered from
defections, broke down, and was abandoned. The demise of the match
can be clearly seen in the number of positions ﬁlled through the match
each year: While in 1996 around 300 positions participated in the match,
by 1999 there were only 14, and in 2000 no centralized match for gas-
troenterologists was even attempted.
The demise of the match seems to have been set in motion in 1993–94,
when, in the midst of general discussions of health care reform, the
subspecialty of gastroenterology subjected itself to a manpower analysis
published by Meyer et al. (1996). Its main conclusions were that the
U.S. health care system and gastroenterologists would beneﬁt from a1346 journal of political economy
reduction in gastroenterology fellowship programs. The Gastroenter-
ology Leadership Council endorsed a goal of a 25–50 percent reduction
in the number of gastroenterology fellows over ﬁve years. Furthermore,
an additional year of training was mandated: starting in the summer of
1996, three years of training were required to be board eligible instead
of two.
However, this announced reduction in supply triggered an even larger
reduction in the number of residents who applied for gastroenterology
fellowship positions. This seems to have been the start of the demise of
the match.
Table 1 shows for each year in which the match took place (one year
before the fellowship starts) the number of positions and the number
of applicants who participated.
In 1996, for the ﬁrst time there were fewer applicants for gastroen-
terology fellowship positions than there were positions offered in the
match. This seems to have triggered a scramble among fellowship pro-
grams to hire early, before the match.
4
The year 1997 was the ﬁrst time a large percentage of positions with-
drew from the match and programs moved early to ﬁll their positions
with qualiﬁed applicants. We shall view 1997 as the ﬁrst year in which
the market was no longer effectively organized via the match. (That is,
gastroenterology fellows who began employment in 1998 and hence
ﬁnished in 2001 will have obtained their job after the match had started
to break down.)
5
Once the match broke down and the commitment to uniform late
appointment dates vanished, the market for gastroenterology fellows
once again experienced unraveling and exploding offers (e.g., Bauer
et al. 1999).
The market also experiences some of the other “typical” costs asso-
ciated with unraveling, apart from mismatching. The ﬁrst is that when
the time comes to begin employment, some applicants fail to fulﬁll their
obligation, made two years in advance, to join the program whose offer
they have accepted. Second, internal medicine residents may not want
to consider gastroenterology because they are not willing to commit to
a subspecialty this early. Interviews now take place before they have the
opportunity to explore other subspecialties (Gorelick 1999).
4 For a detailed account of the collapse of the gastroenterology match and why failures
of stable matches are rare, see McKinney et al. (2003).
5 The parent organization of the match, the NRMP, also changed its policy in reaction
to the breakdown of the gastroenterology match. Effective July 1, 2001, the NRMPrequires
the sponsoring organization to sign an “NRMP Program Directors Annual Participation
Agreement” annually committing active participation of at least 75 percent of the eligible
programs and a minimum of 75 percent of all available positions in the specialty for a
given year. Subsequent failure to register 75 percent of programs or positions in a given
year jeopardizes the NRMP’s management of future matches.TABLE 1
Participation in the Gastroenterology Match
Year
Positions
Advertised
Posts
Withdrawn
Percentage
Withdrawn
Posts in
Match
Percentage
Matched
Number of
Programs
Number of
Applicants
Number of
Applicants/
Positions
in Match
1992 … … … 377 96.6 160 658 1.75
1993 374  25  6.7 399 94 173 642 1.6
1994 … … … 369 93 169 591 1.6
1995 351 14 4 337 88.7 171 433 1.3
1996 313 15 4.8 298 74.8 164 277 .9
1997 254 41 16.1 213 85 128 240 1.1
1998 178 79 44.3 99 77.8 60 148 1.5
1999 35 21 60 14 … 11 … …
Note.—For each year, positions advertised is the number of positions whose availability in the match was announced in late March. Until late May, the programs may add or
withdraw positions (posts withdrawn), which leaves the ﬁnal number of positions in the match (posts in match). Percentage matched is the percentage of positions in the match
that are ﬁlled by the match. Number of applicants is the total number of applicants who listed at least one gastroenterology program in their rank order list.1348 journal of political economy
Fig. 1.—Share of mobility of gastroenterology fellows for each year. The vertical lines
indicate the beginning and the end of the use of the centralized match, measured in year
of fellowship completion.
III. Mobility of Gastroenterologists with and without a Match
We purchased from the American Medical Association (via Medical Mar-
keting Service) a data set of all living physicians who have completed,
or are currently completing, a gastroenterology fellowship, are board-
certiﬁed gastroenterologists, or claim gastroenterology as a specialty.
The data contain the years in which each physician graduated from
medical school and ﬁnished each residency; the specialty of the resi-
dency; and the name, city, and state of the institutions at which the
medical studies and residencies were done.
Of the 15,187 entries, 9,180 fellows completed a residency in the
United States and subsequently a gastroenterology fellowship in the
United States after 1977, in 433 different hospital codes coming from
680 places. After 1977, each year (apart from 2003, the last data point)
has at least 200 fellows ﬁnishing their residency; the numbers are lower
before that.
6
These data allow us to measure changes in the scope of the market
by comparing the mobility of gastroenterology fellows when there was
a match to the mobility before and after the match. A gastroenterology
fellow moves whenever the fellowship is at a hospital different from the
residency hospital before the fellowship.
In ﬁgure 1, the mobility over hospitals (Hosp) is the percentage of
gastroenterology fellows who change hospital after ﬁnishing their
(mostly) internal medicine residency and starting the gastroenterology
fellowship. The mobility over city and state measures the percentage of
fellows who move to a different city and state, respectively.
Table 2 provides the differences across mobility with p-values, where
6 For a more detailed account, see Niederle and Roth (2001).mobility in a labor market 1349
TABLE 2
Differences across Mobility
Difference
Match  
Prematch
Match 1  
Prematch
Match 2  
Match 1
Postmatch  
Match 2
Postmatch  
Match
Postmatch  
Prematch
Hospital .079
(.0001)
.052
(.0015)
.053
(.0163)
 .096
(.0201)
 .069
(.0433)
.009
(.5175)
City .059
(.0008)
.032
(.0184)
.054
(.0039)
 .058
(.0707)
 .031
(.1939)
.028
(.4054)
State .041
(.0045)
.014
(.0990)
.053
(.0250)
 .026
(.4386)
0
(.8852)
.041
(.2294)
Note.—Prematch: 1980–88; match: 1989–2000; match 1: 1989–94; match 2: 1995–2000; and postmatch: 2001–3. p-
values are in parentheses.
we use a two-sided Mann-Whitney U test, with the proportion of mobility
in each year as our data points.
The introduction of a centralized clearinghouse signiﬁcantly increases
mobility across hospitals, across cities, and across states. That this in-
crease is gradual as measured over the ﬁrst and second six-year periods
of the match conforms with experimental results (Kagel and Roth 2000;
McKinney et al. 2003) in which the centralized match only gradually
becomes fully used by participants. Mobility sharply declines after the
demise of the match, which lends strong support to the hypothesis that
the increase in mobility during match years is indeed due to the match,
and not to a general change in mobility of physicians over time. This
suggests that the centralized clearinghouse has an important effect on
the matching of fellows to fellowships, and not only on its timing.
An alternative explanation for the increase in mobility during the use
of a centralized clearinghouse may be that different internal medicine
physicians, speciﬁcally physicians who have always been more mobile,
choose to become gastroenterologists. To control for this possibility, we
now compute for each gastroenterology fellow a measure of mobility
that corresponds to a change in city or state after ﬁnishing medical
school and moving to the residency completed just before entering their
fellowship. For this purpose we discard all foreign graduate students,
reducing the sample to 6,789 physicians.
Figure 2 compares mobility from medical school to residency (the
“City IM” line) and from residency to gastroenterology fellowship (the
“City GI” line) at the city level. (The graph for the state level is very
similar. Students always move at the institutional level since they are not
employed by the medical schools.) To keep track of the same individuals,
they are always tabulated in the year of completion of the gastroenter-
ology fellowship.
Not surprisingly, physicians become less mobile as they advance in
their careers. There is no evidence that the change in mobility of gas-1350 journal of political economy
Fig. 2.—Mobility across cities for the fellowship position before gastroenterology (in-
ternal medicine) and to gastroenterology. The City GI line represents mobility acrosscities
from residency to gastroenterology fellowship (as in ﬁg. 1); City IM reﬂects, for the same
fellows, mobility between medical school and the last fellowship before gastroenterology
(mostly internal medicine). The vertical lines represent the beginning and the end of the
match.
troenterology fellows during the centralized match is driven by an in-
crease in mobile physicians choosing to become gastroenterologists. On
the contrary, the mobility of fellows between medical school and their
fellowship before gastroenterology is slightly increasing over time. That
is, even though there is a striking decline in the mobility of gastroen-
terology fellows before and after the match, when the same individuals
were younger and entering their internal medicine residencies, they
showed no difference in mobility.
7
IV. Conclusions
The data show that the use of a centralized clearinghouse affects not
only the timing of the market but also its scope. When the market is
decentralized and appointments are made far in advance, the market
is less national in scope than when a centralized match was in place.
The mobility of gastroenterology fellows, as measured by whether their
gastroenterology fellowship is in the same hospital, city, or state as their
former residency, signiﬁcantly increased with the use of a centralized
match.
8
7 This also makes clear why studying gastroenterologists, for whom we have data not
only before the institution of a centralized match but also after its demise, allows us to
separate changes in mobility due to changes over time (such as we see in mobility to
internal medicine residencies) from changes in mobility due to the market mechanism.
8 When matching is decentralized and early, hiring seems to occur more through per-
sonal networks. Networks can be sources of otherwise scarce information,theycanfacilitate
transactions when they must be completed quickly, and they can enhance the credibility
of commitments made years in advance. There appears to have been no effect, however,
on wages. Niederle and Roth (2003b) observe that fellowship wages in internal medicine
subspecialties that continue to use the MSMP program are not different from fellowship
wages in gastroenterology and other subspecialties that do not presently use a match.mobility in a labor market 1351
The proximate cause of the demise of the gastroenterology match
seems to have been the shock to the market in 1996 (see McKinney et
al. [2003] for an experiment that studies such shocks). Since then, the
number of positions has stabilized, raising the question of whether a
match could be successfully reinstituted. The results of the present study
suggest that reintroducing a centralized match would increase the scope
of the market and the mobility of gastroenterologists, as well as allow
matches to be made after more information has become available.
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